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Mr. President:
No one believes more staunchly in private enterprise than do I.
It has always been my inclination to be opposed to any governmental
action in competition with private enterprise.

At the same time,

there are certain responsibilities of government , which, even when
participated in to the fullest practical extent by private endeavor,
can only be met, in the final analysis, by governmental activity.
In other words, Mr . President, in our zeal to protect private enter
prise, we can accomplish too much of a good thing, particularly when
we lose sight of our ultimate objective, which is the security of our
country o

Such a situation is being approached by the provisions of Se ction
631 of the Defense Appropriation Bill .

Excessive concern for commercial

aviation has caused us to progressively nibble away at the Military

s~

Air Transportation~-- to such an extent as to practically immobilize
it.

In fiscal _ 1955, MATS spent $4.5 million on business with the

airlines of the United States.

This amount has increased with each

subsequent year to an all time high for fiscal 1959 of approximately

lf'b'~o~

t~71 million for overseas airlift.

This year the House MS rot set a mandatory amount~for procurement
of commercial air transportation services.

The Senate Appropriations

Subcommittee earmarked $150 million of MATS funds for commercial air
transportation procurement, but this was reduced to $100 million by the
full Committee.

The amount is still flagrantly excessive.
-1-

lflATS has a specific wartime mission to perform, which I shall
discuss shortly.

Its crews need training to prepare for that mission .

The earmarking of ~~100 million of MATS funds for commercial airlift,
even with the flexible language now in Section 631, will merely induce
untold pressures on the Secretary of Defense to spend this sum.

The

airline industry is now receiving a fair and adequate share of MATS
business, and if we continue to increase that share, we stand in danger
of subverting the national security and our survival.

v

No one claims that MATS is now prepared, nor should be augmented to
obtain a sufficient capability, to do the job of air transport alone.
The commercial carriers are needed and they are now being utilized.
During this past fiscal year, the Department of Defense actually spent
about ~,200 million for the purchase of military airlift for all purposes.
Of this total MATS spent $71 million to buy augmented commercial airlift
for cargo and military passengers overseas alone .
If, however, MATS is forced to spend more than that amount of money
on commercial airlift, it would be uneconomical.

The taxpayer would

be paying twice--once for MATS training and again for commercial air~

lift 'for loads that MATS could carry while training at a five-hour per
day pace.

Even worse, the substantial increase in the commercial

augmentation program/could force MATS to reduce its integral size--in
other words, to reduce personnel, dispense with part of its air fleet,
close down some of its bases, disperse its efforts and become a mere
cipher in our military planning.

~lhile we should be undertaking to

modernize our strategic air transport :tleet , we are, in effect., considering
a step which could demobilize a considerable part of our air transport
capability

0

This would throw the burden of tnansport and support of the
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Armed Forces/ very heavily on commercial operators / in the event of
an emergency .

Just what this would do to ·the bulk of our heavy

weapons deliveries, not to mention domestic air travel , is difficult
to foresee, because we cannot anticipate the extent of such an emergency .
Far from competing with the airlines , ~'IA.TS is now using the airlines
in a business-like and economical way when they are needed .

But at

the same time , the space which MATS itself has available on its train
ing missions /is used to carry material and personnel overseas / and
thereby save a very substantial amount of money for the Department of
Defense and the three military services and the American public .
What would it cost if MATS planes flew empty on their training missions?
The most reliable estimate is three quarters of a billion dollars /4n
funds which would have to be produced from taxes / and added to the budgets
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force .

Under the Industrial Fund Investment
I

Plan , the services must pay MATS for airlift /whether it is military
or commercial .

Therefore , the incongruous part of any sizable increase

in the augmentation fund / would be that MATS, in order to maintain its
state of readiness , will have to fly its five hours over the same
identical routes as the commercial carrier , carrying a dummy load or
even worse, empty !
The more responsible and prudent course /4. s to earmark a reasonable
and more modest sum for procurement of commercial airlift .

Our whole

concept of defense /presupposes an adequate air transport S¥stem for the
Army , Navy and Air Force .

In the early days of an emergency , and ,

indeed, for the continuation of the emergency in the critical area,
it is military planes and crews that will have to deliver the goods.
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These military planes and crews are available only in MATS .

Our

full commercial airlift potential / will undoubtedly be essential in
such an operation , but the initial effort and all effort in the danger
zone must be by the military .
I11LJI...TS has been called on in emergencies repeatedly since ·rforld War II- 

in the Berlin airlift , Korea , and last year/ the twin crises of Lebanon
and Formosa.

Even though their planes are growing old and outdated in

service-- and they have no jets in the strategic air transport fleet -MATS has never been found wanting .
One factor/ above all/ is essential to the continued response of
the strategic air transport fleet .

They must meet the minimum training

requirements , which are just as necessary for Iv TS , as they are for the
strategic and tactical air command 9 , the Army , Navy, Marines or Coast
Guard .

The ¥.LATS training mission minimumh.s five hours per day per

aircraft/ on the average .
at all costs.

This minimum of training must be maintained

On the other hand, it would be no less than fiscal

foolishness /to require these planes to fly their training missions
empty , while procuring commercial airlift for military cargo and
passengers over the same routes/which military planes fly their training
missions .
Both military and commercial airlift potential 're essential to
our defense effort .

Let us seek a solution compatible with the maximum

preservation[ of each .

If our air supply lifeline is weakened/or

perhaps severed , our global bases and our global position as a world
power are undermined .

We must always bear the consequences of enemy

action against that supply lifeline; but let us not , b¥ our own neglect
or devotion to business as usual, wreck the very substance of the
military power on which our national existence depends .
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Mr . President:
I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be read .

This amendment would reduce the amount which shall be available /
only for procurement of commercial air transportation service /rrom
~~100 million to .;~70 million .

This is just under the $71 million /so

utilized during fiscal 1959 , the highest to date .
This does not mean that more , even ~~100 million or $150 million ,
could not be used for procurement of commercial air transportation by
1v1ATS .

The ~~70 million , or the ;~100 million as it now stands , is a

minimum figure .

Surely ;)70 million , only {fol million less than the

highest sum ever spent for this purpose , is a high enough minimum
to impose on the Secretary of Defense .

I sincerely hope that the

Senate will see fit to adopt this lower , and more realistic minimum.

END
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